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This paper compares the magnitude and distribution of regional subsidies to Southern 
industry to those of subsidies available in the country as a whole through the national 
industrial policy. The comparison highlights the fact that from the second half of the 
1970s, industry located in the most prosperous region of Italy, the North-West, was 
the main beneficiary of subsidised credit. These findings refine our understanding of 
the regional policy for Southern Italy and the reasons for its limited achievements. 
Moreover, the redirection of subsidies away from the South cast doubts on the extent 
of the Italian government’s commitment to its programme of regional development. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Increasing attention has been paid recently to the spatial impact of all types of 
government expenditure and consequently to the appraisal of expenditure in overt 
regional policies in the wider context of overall government spending (MACKAY and 
WILLIAMS, 2005; HEALD and SHORT, 2002; ARMSTRONG and TAYLOR, 
2000, SHORT, 1981). This line of investigation allows an assessment of the extent to 
which public expenditure reflects regional ‘needs’ and clarifies whether this reflects a 
coherent implementation of regional programmes (GRIPAIOS and BISHOP, 2005; 
MACKAY and WILLIAMS, 2005; MCLEAN and MCMILLAN, 2003). This type of 
analysis is also important in order to assess whether government spending helped to 
create a comparative advantage for assisted areas in attracting economic activity and 
investment. This effect might be reduced greatly and even offset by public spending 
in other regions.  
 
This paper adopts a similar line of investigation to reassess the much-publicised 
commitment of the Italian government to address the country’s economic dualism, 
between the prosperous North and the underdeveloped South. The analysis covers the 
whole experience of the Italian regional policy, the so-called ‘Extraordinary 
intervention for the South’ and focuses on two major financial tools to promote 
Southern industry: subsidised loans and grants. These are studied in the context of 
subsidies available throughout the country within the framework of the national 
industrial policy. This comparative analysis brings to light unknown features of the 
Italian regional and national industrial policies and points out a spatial distribution 
that reflects neither the relative underdevelopment of the recipient regions nor the   3
priority position officially attributed to the government regional effort. Moreover, the 
attempt to assess the demand for financial subsidies, performed in this paper for the 
first time, helps to clarify to what extent the diversion of resources away from 
underdeveloped regions was an institutional decision.  
 
The paper is structured in four sections. It begins with an overview of the system of 
regional subsidies to industry and its national counterpart, from their inception in the 
1950s to the end of the regional programme in 1993. It moves on to provide a long-
term analysis of the geographical distribution of subsidised and market medium-term 
credit in section two, and the third section estimates the ‘net subsidy’ within 
subsidised credit extended. The final section, based on unpublished Ministry of 
Industry datasets, assesses to what extent the institutions managing regional and 
national subsidies were able to satisfy the applications for these.  
 
REGIONAL AND NATIONAL INCENTIVES TO INDUSTRY 
 
Every document on Italian economic policy stresses the public sector’s involvement 
in efforts to overcome the country’s economic dualism (PADOA SCHIOPPA 
KOSTORIS, 1993, p.75). Such efforts began in 1950 with the establishment of the 
Cassa per il Mezzogiorno (henceforth Cassa) an institution created ad hoc to manage 
a complex regional programme, the ‘Extraordinary intervention for the South’, 
supported not only domestically, but also by the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (D’ANTONE, 1997). The Italian regional 
programme was all-embracing and ranged from building infrastructure to land 
reclamation and the financing of industry.    4
 
Figure 1 around here 
 
Cassa intervention in industry began in 1957 and took the form of financial subsidies - 
soft loans, grants and fiscal subsidies – and industrial infrastructure, including 
connecting industrial sites to energy sources, water supply and sewage. The rationale 
and priorities in extending subsidies and providing infrastructure changed over time. 
In 1957, Cassa activities were concentrated in specific locations called ‘nuclei’ and 
‘areas’ of industrialisation, clearly attempting an implementation of the growth pole 
theory (PERROUX, 1955; HIRSHMAN, 1988). From 1971, it sought to encourage 
investment in areas experiencing depopulation and from 1976, all such differentiation 
in the South was abandoned. 
 
Grants, introduced in 1957, were available for the purchase of machinery (up to 20% 
of total expenditure) and construction costs (up to 25%), with the level depending on 
several factors such as industrial sector, investment per employee, firm size and 
location. The maximum grants were awarded to firms in modern sectors undertaking 
large investments within a nucleus (ALLEN and MACLENNAN, 1970). 
 
The original 1957 definition of size of eligible firms (less than 500 employees and 
fixed assets below 3bn lire) was soon abandoned (PERGOLESI, 1988). By 1962 
limits on employees and fixed assets were lifted and grants could be awarded on the 
first 6bn of investment for firms of any size. The lifting of the size limits has been a 
much-debated aspect of the policy. It has been interpreted as a diversion of the 
incentive system away from its original intention of developing an organic network of   5
SMEs, and a reflection of the need to attract modern industries to the South and 
investment from large Northern companies (DUNFORD, 1988; CONTI, 1979; 
FEDERICO and GIANNETTI, 1999).    
  
The Cassa-subsidised loans were extended at interest rates varying between 3% and 
5% with the lowest interest for smaller plants. Loans could cover a maximum 70% of 
the planned investment, were repayable over 15 years and could be obtained in 
addition to grants, with the provision that the combined grant and loan could not 
exceed 85% of the total investment (ALLEN and MCLENNAN). The Cassa covered 
the differential between subsidised and market interest rates, whereas the loans were 
to be managed by the three medium-term credit institutions (henceforth MTCIs) 
operating in the South, Isveimer, Irfis and Cis, which thus bore the risk of bad loans 
and defaults.  
 
In the period under analysis the Italian banking system was specialised in market 
terms, meaning that banks could collect and lend money on the short-term market 
only and MTCIs could collect and lend money on the medium-term market only.  The 
two markets were closely connected, the banks being among the establishing partners 
of the MTCIs. Setting up MTCIs was the way the banks could access the medium-
term credit market, and the banks could finance them by purchasing their bonds. 
Short-term credit was defined as repayable within one year and medium-term credit 
from one to ten years, except in Southern Italy (up to 15 years) (PONTOLILLO, 
1971).  
   6
The Cassa 1957 scheme was not the first, as from the early 1950s, soft loans for small 
and medium-sized firms (SMEs) were available throughout Italy and were regarded as 
a major instrument of national industrial policy. The national schemes were a 
response to the belief of the Bank of Italy (henceforth BoI) and the Association of 
Industrialists (Confindustria) that SMEs needed additional support, as they had less 
bargaining power with banks and were disadvantaged in terms of accessing financial 
markets. The BoI was aware of the importance of small firms in the Italian economy: 
a report from the BoI Study Centre shows that firms with fewer than 100 workers 
employed almost 37% of the national workforce in 1947 (ASSO and RAITANO, 
1999). Political considerations, such as gaining the support of small entrepreneurs and 
avoiding concentrations of labour demand and supply, also played a significant role in 
the formulation of national schemes (CERS-IRS, 1986). 
 
From 1952 SMEs in the whole country could receive soft loans through Regional 
Medium-Term Credit Institutions (RMTCIs, Mediocrediti Regionali), which were 
able to extend loans at lower interest rates (6.5%) because they could refinance 
themselves under favourable terms at the Central Medium-Term Credit Institution 
(CMTCI, Mediocredito Centrale), established by the Treasury in 1952 
(MEDIOCREDITO CENTRALE, 1955). Another scheme, subsidised by the Ministry 
of Industry (MI), was launched in 1959. While the RMTCIs offered small loans of up 
to 50m lire, the MI offered larger loans on preferential terms for Southern firms. 
Firms in the South could borrow up to 1bn lire, repayable over 15 years at an interest 
rate of 3%, while firms elsewhere could borrow only up to 500m, repayable over 10 
years at 5% (ABI, 1963). In subsequent years, yet more schemes were introduced. Of 
particular interest is the Sabbatini scheme (1329/1965), which sought to help the   7
machine tool industry recover from the crisis. It subsidised the purchasing and leasing 
of domestically produced machines - a limitation later abolished in accordance with 
EEC regulations - worth between 1m and 3bn lire and the scheme was managed by 
the MCC (MEDIOCREDITO CENTRALE, OSSERVATORIO SULLE PICCOLE e 
MEDIE IMPRESE, 1997; SCANAGATTA, 1989). Both the producer and the 
purchaser benefited from this scheme as producers could rediscount bills and 
purchasers could dilute the payment over five years at a subsidised interest rate 
(MOMIGLIANO, 1986). In the second half of the 1960s a scheme in favour of 
exporting firms was also introduced (131/1967). This envisaged tools such as 
subsidised insurance to export credits and the provision of credit finance at subsidised 
interest rates (PONTOLILLO, 1971). The proliferation of schemes, later called a 
‘jungle of incentives’, in which the same firm could benefit from several schemes, is 
interpreted in the literature as a consequence of the lack of a coherent industrial 
policy. The absence of an all-embracing approach left room for pressures from 
economic and industrial groups, which then brought about the formulation of 
individual schemes addressing specific and/or sectoral problems (BARCA and 
MANGHETTI, 1976).   
 
The awareness of the need to simplify the loan system led to the harmonisation of 
regional and national schemes in 1976-77. By that time, subsidised credit was 
perceived as a particularly important tool of the country’s economic policy due to the 
severe 1975 recession and the BoI’s restrictive monetary policy. It was felt that in 
such a situation, credit to industry had to work as a balancing and corrective 
mechanism able to facilitate firms’ access to credit (VASSALLI and VISENTINI, 
1978). Various subsidised credit schemes were unified in a single one (scheme   8
902/76). The whole country was classified according to various degrees of 
development and subsidised credit was made available throughout, on progressively 
preferential conditions for less developed regions. For instance investment up to 15bn 
could benefit from soft loans in the South, whereas investment up to 7bn only could 
be eligible in underdeveloped areas of the Centre. The details for each region are 
given in table 4 in the Appendix. In addition a new soft loan scheme was introduced 
in 1977 (scheme 657/77). This scheme is considered particularly important as it 
emphasised the restructuring of existing plants, rather than the establishment of new 
ones (PENT FORMENGO, 1986). The terms of the availability of soft loans 
throughout the country were similar to those of the 1976 scheme (Appendix, table 5). 
In addition the Cassa amended its grant scheme in 1976 (Appendix, table 6) and the 
value of the maximum combined total subsidy (soft loan and grant) was reduced from 
85% to 75%. 
 
Subsequent years saw further schemes, such as the Fund for Technological 
Innovation, managed by the MI and set up in 1982. This aimed to provide soft loans 
to firms of any size planning to undertake investment to introduce technologically 
advanced production processes and is still considered the pillar of the policy for 
technological innovation in Italy (MOMIGLIANO, 1986). SMEs were also entitled to 
grants for the purchase and leasing of high-tech equipment (scheme 696/1983). 
Southern SMEs were entitled to grants covering up to 32% of the cost of the 
equipment and SMEs located elsewhere in the country up to 25% (CAMPUS, 1995). 
 
The Cassa had been established as a temporary institution, supposed to last until 1980, 
but between 1980 and 1986 11 ministerial decrees were passed to prolong its   9
activities. All political parties agreed to maintain an additional flow of resources to 
the South but there was disagreement concerning the institutional framework for the 
management of these funds. The 11 decrees left the institution in a state of uncertainty 
and precariousness, for each prolonged the Cassa’s life for a brief period only, 
sometimes as short as a year or even three months (CAFIERO and MARCIANI, 
1992). 
  
In 1986 the ‘extraordinary intervention’ was refinanced until 1993. As that date 
approached, attempts to prolong funding failed because of domestic and external 
pressures. The parliamentary debate coincided with growing resentment in the North 
about the level of public expenditure in the South and its harmful effects on Northern 
employment. Furthermore, critics pointed out that few tangible results had been 
achieved in 40 years of the Southern policies, which had been a drain on the economy 
of the North. In addition, there was growing antipathy towards the role of the public 
administration in the Italian economy and towards the institutional structure operating 
the Mezzogiorno policy. These tensions led to calls for a referendum on the Southern 
policy and the considerable success of the Northern separatists. The European 
Commission also influenced the course of events, by refusing to approve the 1992 bill 
to refinance the Agency. Given the Commission’s opposition, in December 1992 the 
Italian Parliament decided to abolish the ‘extraordinary intervention’ and its 
institutions, with the Southern policy to be replaced by a national programme of 
assistance for depressed areas (CAFIERO, 2000). 
   10
THE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF SUBSIDIES 
 
This section studies the regional distribution of subsidised medium-term credit (MTC) 
generated by the convoluted system of regional and national soft-loan schemes, 
illustrated in the previous section. The analysis is broken into sub-periods reflecting 
the changes in the policy regimes and starts in 1953, when the first soft loan scheme 
became operational. The division into sub-periods also makes it possible to make 
allowance for variations and inconsistencies in the statistics over time.    
 
Table 1 around here 
  
Table 1 clearly shows that from the second sub-period (1957-65) the South was the 
region benefiting most from soft loans. In the first half of the 1950s, when the only 
soft-loan scheme was that subsidised by the MCC (scheme 949/52), the North-West 
was the main recipient, whereas the South received the lowest share. The small 
number of loans extended to the South is explained by the MCC in terms of the lack 
of interest from credit institutions in the South. The scheme offered credit institutions 
the possibility of refinancing themselves at a lower interest rate, but Southern credit 
institutions could finance themselves using funds bearing no cost, such as their 
endowment funds and funds provided by the Cassa, which were also expected to 
increase in the following years (MEDIOCREDITO CENTRALE, 1954 and 1955). 
 
Figures for the 1957-65 period include soft loans extended by the MCC and by the MI 
(scheme 623/59). The only scheme operational in those years and not included in the 
table is the one managed by the Cassa. Information on soft loans managed by the   11
Cassa between 1957 and 1965 is available, although from a different source, but could 
not be included in table 1 as it refers only to soft loans approved by the Cassa in those 
years, whereas information on MCC and MI schemes in table 1 refers to loans 
actually extended. However, the value of soft loans approved under the Cassa scheme 
in these years was 880bn 1980 lire, i.e. an annual average of 97.8 billion. Information 
on soft loans managed by the Cassa between 1957 and 1965 is included in table 3.  
 
It seems important to note that even excluding soft loans granted to Southern firms by 
the Cassa, the South received the lion’s share from the second sub-period. Obviously 
this was the result of a larger number of soft loans extended and/or larger sums 
granted to the South through national schemes. These allowed Southern firms to 
borrow twice as much as their Northern and Central counterparts. Thus by the end of 
the 1960s, the South consolidated its position as main recipient of soft loans, but the 
North-West also increased its share to 27.5%. The Centre and the North-East received 
a progressively smaller share. 
 
Starting from 1966 the Bank of Italy published a consistent series of information on 
the lending activity of the MTCIs. Therefore it was possible to calculate the annual 
net balance of credit transactions from that date to the end of the period under 
analysis. Figure 2 displays the results. Subsidised credit includes sums awarded under 
all national schemes in operation, and for the South, all loans issued by the Cassa. 
 
Figure 2 around here 
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As already noted in table 1, the South, entitled to both national and regional schemes, 
was by far the main beneficiary until 1972. In 1971, the provision of credit increased 
throughout the country, reaching values well above the average for the previous 
period. In 1972, Southern Italy experienced an even more remarkable increase in the 
supply of subsidised MTC, mainly because 1972 was the first year in which credit 
envisaged by a new scheme approved at the end of 1971 (scheme 853/71) was 
actually available. These years also witnessed an exceptional increase in demand for 
credit resulting from the exceptional quantity of industrial applications, mainly 
concerning plans for investment in the basic sectors in the South (BANCA 
D’ITALIA, 1971d).   
 
From 1973-74 the net balance of credit transactions became negative for all regions, 
as new issues of such credit were lower than the repayments on previous issues. 
Various factors were responsible: funds allocated as contributions towards interest 
payments dried up in some sectors; and the MTCIs had problems raising funds, due to 
the drop in quotations on the bond market. This last factor, combined with the delay 
in adjusting the base rates on subsidised operations, made medium-term lending 
unprofitable. Until the reorganisation of subsidised credit in 1976, interest rates were 
fixed by the appropriate law or by ad hoc decrees, whereas the Cassa or government 
contribution varied to cover the difference between the subsidised interest rate and the 
base rate. The base rate, defined on the basis of the cost (weighted average) incurred 
by the MTCIs in issuing bonds in the previous four months, was determined 
bimonthly by the Interministerial Committee for Credit and Savings (ICCS). Despite 
the increase in ordinary interest rates after 1973, subsidised interest rates remained 
constant until 1975, when they rose for all categories of loans (see Appendix, figure   13
11). This system was ended in 1976, when subsidised interest rates were pegged to the 
reference rate.  
 
The delays in adjusting the base rate resulted in a dramatic decrease in the availability 
of subsidised as well as ordinary MTC (for ordinary MTC see figures 12 and 13 in the 
Appendix). Given the difference between short- and long-term interest rates, banks 
preferred lending their liquid assets at higher interest rates, i.e. short-term. Diverting 
resources from medium- to short-term lending was technically possible because of 
close institutional and economic links between the MTCIs and the banks (BANCA 
D’ITALIA, 1974d). As explained in the previous section, the MTCIs had been 
created, under the terms of their charters, by the ordinary banks, which helped finance 
the MTCIs by acquiring their bonds.  
 
The BoI intervened in order to redirect money into the medium-term market, 
preserving low interest rates. In June 1973 the BoI introduced the so-called ‘portfolio 
obligation’ (vincolo di portafoglio), which obliged banks to increase their investment 
in bonds, a large share of which was issued by MTCIs, to a minimum of 6% of their 
deposits. This ‘portfolio obligation’ was renewed periodically until 1978, but after 
1975 the size of investment as a percentage of new deposits was gradually decreased 
(FAZIO, 1979). Moreover, between 1973-78 the BoI tried to protect small firms from 
credit rationing. It imposed a ceiling on further loans to all groups of borrowing firms, 
with the exception of the smallest group, considered the most affected by the liquidity 
squeeze (CROFF and PASSACANTANDO, 1979). 
  
From 1975, MTC recovered slightly due to the BoI measures, the increase in the net   14
value of securities issued by the institutions and the profitability of the adjusted base 
rate and interest rates on MTC (BANCA D’ITALIA, 1975d). For although the net 
balance of credit transactions remained rather low and even negative until the 
beginning of the 1980s, it never again reached the 1974 low. However, the area where 
the net balance of subsidised credit transactions remained consistently negative until 
1984-85 was the South, the area previously receiving the lion’s share!  
 
Figure 3 gives a clearer understanding of the direction of subsidised MTC after 1976. 
It is based on statistics on new subsidised MTC extended published by the BoI from 
1974 onwards. These figures are preferable, as they are not affected by changes in 
patterns of loan repayments.  
 
Figure 3 around here 
 
From 1976, a major change took place in the direction of subsidised credit, and the 
North-West, rather than the South, became the main beneficiary. The BoI explained 
the South’s dramatically reduced share of subsidised MTC in 1976 as the result of a 
tendency, already apparent in the previous years, to leave the financing of Southern 
firms almost entirely to the Cassa, whereas national schemes concentrated on the 
North and Centre. In 1976, the South’s disadvantage became evident due to the delay 
in approving the 1976 scheme, whereas the previous scheme (law 853/1971) covered 
only the 1971-75 period. Not only was the access of Southern firms to national 
schemes reduced, after 1976, but Cassa expenditure on subsidies as well as its overall 
expenditure also started to fall, as shown in figure 4 below.   
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Figure 4 around here 
 
The analysis presented in this section shows that the 1976 ‘re-organisation and 
harmonisation’ of subsidised credit throughout the country meant not only that 
‘incentives that were once reserved to the South were extended on massive scale to 
the entire country’, as noted by FAINI and SCHIANTARELLI (1983) and DEL 
MONTE and GIANNOLA (1997), but more precisely that the South lost its position 
as the main beneficiary, which was taken over by the most prosperous area of the 
country, the North-West. PERGOLESI (1988) also noted the diversion of subsidised 
credit away from the South to the North-West but timed it differently, in 1973-74, on 
the grounds that from 1973 subsidised credit decreased in the South. However, the 
decrease was even more marked in the North-West in those years, and therefore at 
that date the South still seems to be ‘privileged’. This is certainly not the case after 
1976, when subsidised credit continued to increase in the North-West and decreased 
in the South. The precise timing of this redirection of resources is an important 
exercise, as it helps us understand the reasons behind it. 
 
It seems plausible to establish a connection between the 1976 ‘reorganisation and 
harmonisation’ of the system of subsidies and the 1975 recession. The fourfold 
increase in the oil price and the indexation of wages, in place since 1970, had a severe 
effect on the profitability of businesses. Italy, like Britain, initially responded to the 
oil shock with expansionist measures that allowed growth to continue, and Italian 
GDP grew by 5.4% in 1974. However, balance of payments problems became more 
severe and the BoI introduced restrictive measures that led to a contraction of 
domestic demand and production and ultimately to a contraction of GDP by 2.7% in   16
1975 (JAMES, 1996, pp. 283-285). It seems plausible that when the Italian GDP fell 
in 1975, for the first time since the Great Depression and the Second World War 
(ROSSI and TONIOLO, 1996), boosting the economy of the whole country, by 
redirecting resources to the most productive regions, rather than the depressed ones, 
became the new priority.  
 
Moreover, following a renewed foreign exchange crisis in January 1976, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to a stand-by arrangement in favour of the 
lira but imposed provisions for reducing the government deficit, controlling internal 
domestic credit, introducing changes in the indexation procedure and maintaining a 
competitive exchange rate (JAMES, 1996).  In addition to this, the decision to join the 
EMS meant stabilising exchange rates, yet another constraint on the devaluation of 
the currency in order to make Italian products more competitive abroad (MICOSSI 
and TRAU, 1994). This might explain the reorganisation of subsidies for exporting 
firms (the original 131/67 scheme was replaced by the 227/77 scheme) and the 100% 
increase in subsidised credit to exports between 1976 and 1978, as shown in figure 5.  
 
Figure 5 around here 
 
The renewed emphasis on credits for exports helps explain the redirection of 
subsidised credit away from regional schemes, but it is not the full story. Figure 5 
above shows that from 1983 onwards subsidised credit for exports decreased whereas 
the unspecified group of ‘other schemes’ increased. The BoI does not clarify which 
schemes are included in this group, but it seems plausible that it includes the 
Sabbatini scheme, as in 1989, when this became a separate item in the BoI statistics,   17
the share of ‘other schemes’ halved. According to other sources, subsidies extended 
through such schemes began an increasing trend from the second half of the 1970s 
(Appendix, figure 14). Moreover, the ‘other schemes’ group is likely to include 
schemes to promote technological innovation, approved in the 1980s (see previous 
section). Figure 6 below shows that the schemes receiving increasing resources after 
1976 were directed mainly to the North-West. 
 
Figure 6 around here 
 
NET SUBSIDY AND ESTIMATED TOTAL SUBSIDIES 
 
The previous section showed that after 1976 the North-West, rather than the South, 
was the main beneficiary of soft loans. However, it might be argued that Southern soft 
loans were extended on more generous conditions than in the rest of the country. 
Interest rates were consistently lower in the South, albeit by as little as 1.6 percentage 
points on average, and the redemption period of Southern soft loans was consistently 
longer, up to 15 years. In order to estimate the net subsidy, or the ‘gift’ component, in 
the soft loans extended to the various regions of the country, the formula devised by 
Faini has been applied (FAINI, 1985, p. 320):  
 





N] }  
where: L = loan; rM = market long-term interest rate; rA = subsidised interest rate; N = length of the 
loan  
 
According to this formula, the absolute size of the net subsidy within a subsidised loan 
depends on the absolute size of the loan, the differential between subsidised and market   18
interest rates and the redemption period.   
 
The estimate is computed on figures referring to the net balance of credit transactions 
from 1966, which include loans extended to the South under all schemes, to 1972, as 
after that date the net balance of credit transactions became negative. The estimate starts 
again from 1974, when the series of the ‘new credit extended’ began, and continues until 
1993.  
 
Figure 7 around here 
 
Figure 8 around here 
 
 
Figures 7 and 8 confirm the picture provided by the previous section. Even taking into 
account the more generous conditions attached to soft loans in the South and 
estimating the ‘gift’ element within soft loans, the North-West remains the main 
beneficiary in the post-1976 period. 
 
It should also be taken into account that Southern Italy was entitled to grants in 
addition to soft loans. Information on grants (presented in table 3) is based on 
unpublished datasets provided by the MI. As previously mentioned, such datasets 
include annual information on grants and subsidised loans, approved by the Cassa in 
the year, but not necessarily extended in the same year, whereas the BoI figures on 
soft loans refer to credit extended within each year. Nevertheless, an attempt has been   19
made to give an idea of the total subsidy going to the South, and therefore grants have 
been added to the net subsidies. The results are displayed in the figure below. 
 
Figure 9 around here 
 
Only if grants are added can the South be said to be the most subsidised area of the 
country after 1976. However, it received fewer subsidies than the rest of the country 
considered together, as shown in figure 10. 
 
Figure 10 around here 
 
REQUESTS FOR, AND AVAILABILITY OF, SUBSIDIES 
 
The analysis conducted in the previous sections has shown to what extent the various 
regions benefited from subsidies. However, whether such a distribution was 
determined by the applications for, or availability of, subsidised loans has not been 
explained. Table 2 below addresses this issue using unpublished data provided by the 
MI.   
 
The MI data set includes information on applications and extension of soft loans 
through two major schemes, the above-mentioned MI scheme (scheme 623/59) and 
the DPR 902, introduced in 1976. The latter marked the reorganisation of soft-loan 
schemes throughout the whole country. Information on these two schemes includes, 
for each year and region, the number of applications received by the central 
institutions, the investment proposed and the value of subsidised loans applied for.   20
Corresponding statistics are provided for approved applications, by year and region, 
specifying their number, the value of the approved investment and size of the 
subsidised loan granted. These figures refer to the second stage of the selection.  The 
initial assessment of the investment project was performed by the credit institutions 
authorised to extend subsidised credit. However, these were under great pressure to 
accept a large number of projects (VENTRIGLIA, 1980; ID., 1981). 
 
Table 2 around here 
 
Columns 3 and 4 clarify the percentage of MTC and MTC directed to finance 
investment (MTCi) represented by the MI and DPR 902 schemes. For the period up to 
1975 and from 1981 to 1986, the schemes for which data were available represent a 
high share of the subsidised credit to industry for investment purposes, and therefore 
the results are most reliable for those periods. The table indicates the degree to which 
the national institutions in charge of subsidised credit responded to applications for 
loans. It is clear that a very high share of the applications for subsidised loans was 
successful, suggesting that areas benefiting less from such schemes were those where 
less subsidised credit had been sought, with the exception of Southern Italy from 1976 
onwards, where far stricter selection criteria were applied after that date. 
 
Table 2 indicates the ability of Southern firms to access only national soft-loan 
schemes. Southern firms and firms expanding in the South were eligible also for soft 
loans and grants managed by the Cassa. Figures on Cassa subsidies in table 9 refer to 
grants and soft loans approved by the Cassa in a given year, rather than those actually 
awarded. This discrepancy was due to the Cassa’s legal permission to grant incentives   21
beyond its current financial means, and it could thus award sums out of funds that 
were expected to be available in years to come (VACCARO, 1995). Table 3 
demonstrates the trends in both availability of, and applications for, Cassa assistance 
from 1957. This table is based on a further data set provided by the MI, specifying the 
number of applications, the value of the investment represented by the applications, 
the number of applications accepted and the investment represented by successful 
applications.  
 
Table 3 around here 
 
The data set includes the value of grants (G) and subsidised loans (L) approved by the 
Cassa (and later the Agency), but it does not include information on the size of 
subsidies requested by the applicants. It is possible to estimate how much demand was 
actually satisfied by Cassa subsidies in terms of investment approved as a percentage 
of investment plans submitted (VA%VS). Moreover, given that the Cassa incentives 
allowed for assistance (loan and grant together) amounting to a maximum of 85% of 
the value of the intended investment (70% after 1975), the maximum demand for 
subsidies can be estimated as 85% (70% after 1975) of the submitted investment 
(VS). Therefore, the maximum satisfied demand (MSD) can be calculated as 
explained in the table keys.  
 
The VA%VR and MSD percentage varied considerably, mainly due to fluctuations in 
the demand (VS). Consistently with the analysis on the BoI statistics, grants and loans 
(G and L) show a decreasing trend after 1975, particularly evident for the latter. It 
seems that overall, regional institutions were not able to satisfy demand for subsidies   22
to a large extent. This made it even more important for Southern firms to be able to 




This paper demonstrates that despite the emphasis on the Italian government’s 
commitment to the development of the South, a large portion of subsidies for industry 
was directed to the most prosperous area of the country, the North-West, from the 
second half of the 1970s. The increase in the availability of subsidies in non-Southern 
regions of the country in the 1970s has been noted by some authors, but the 
magnitude of the increase was not known, and neither was the fact that subsidies and 
soft loans awarded to the North and Centre (considered together) outweighed those 
given to the South. 
  
Using original MI records, this paper has also assessed to what extent institutions in 
charge of subsidised credit responded to applications for loans. The issue is covered 
for the first time in this paper, and it is clear that the distribution of subsidies was 
driven by the applications for subsidies rather than by their availability. The only 
exception was Southern Italy from 1976 onwards, the only region where the share of 
accepted applications for national schemes started to decrease.  
 
It is acknowledged that the changed economic conditions following the oil crisis 
created a hostile environment for regional policies in various Western European 
countries. The disillusionment with regional policies led to the redefinition of assisted 
areas in the UK, which brought about a reduction of those to two-thirds of the area   23
included in the pre-1978 definition (YUILL et al.). In Italy this meant a redirection of 
resources from regional to national and sectoral schemes. After the 1975 recession, 
fostering the development of the South was no longer a priority, and the new priority 
was to boost the national economy and its exports.  
 
The distribution of government funds is a politically sensitive issue. The growing 
discontent recorded in the North of Italy towards the regional programme and the 
ruling parties that managed it might have played a role in the diversion of subsidies 
(D’ANTONE, 1997; CASSON, 1999). Given firms’ declining profits, due to high 
labour costs since 1969, the fourfold increase of oil prices, and increasing taxation, 
government subsidies might have been used as a balancing mechanism and as an 
instrument to create political consensus.  
 
These results of the regional distribution of subsidies in Italy are striking when 
compared to similar work on the UK (MACKAY and WILLIAMS, 2003, MCLEAN 
and MCMILLAN, 2003), which broadly confirmed a distribution of identifiable 
public spending dictated by ‘needs’ and pointed out only three significant outliers: 
Northern Ireland, Scotland and London. The Italian case after 1976 seems of far 
greater proportions, even when considering only identifiable expenditure. Admittedly, 
this article has not measured the Italian departure from the criterion of ‘needs’ in a 
way that is strictly comparable with the studies on Britain. However, it seems that 
even a less detailed analysis, like the one performed, has thrown clear light on the 
post-1976 redirection of subsidies away from the South.  
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Of course, these results raise the question whether this was an efficient use of public 
resources. It has been argued that expenditure to improve infrastructure, health or 
human capital where these are poor is more effective than the same amount spent in 
areas where these are good (MCLEAN and MCMILLAN, 2003). However, evidence 
suggests that this may not be the case when public expenditure takes the form of 
credit to industry. In this instance the opposite may be the case, with Northern firms 
recording higher returns on capital provided by the Italian government than Southern 
firms. Nevertheless, it might be argued whether government credit was at all 
necessary for Northern firms, which could have financed themselves on the market 
(SPADAVECCHIA, 2003).  
 
The new evidence emerging from this paper refines our understanding of the 
persistence of the North-South gap in Italy. There is wide agreement that the main 
achievement of the ‘extraordinary intervention for the South’ lay in preventing the 
widening of the gap between North and South, rather than in promoting convergence. 
However, given the regional distribution of subsidised credit and grants shown in this 
paper, interpreting such a lack of convergence as a ‘failure’ of the South or of the 
regional policy does not seem correct. Subsidies to other areas of the country were 
significant, and this was bound to affect the comparative performance of the South.  
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Table 1: Geographical distribution of subsidised MTC, 1953-1965 (annual average, 
bn, 1980 lire) 
1953-56 North-W North-E  Centre  South  Italy 
bn  lire  48.4 23.7 26.6 19.8  118.5 
%  Italy  40.8 20.0 22.5 16.7 100 
1957-65       
bn  lire 152.7 119.4 113.6 252.4      638.1 
%  Italy  23.9 18.7 17.8 39.6 100 
1966-70       
bn  lire  771 365 421  1,240  2,797 
%  Italy  27.5 13.1 15.1 44.3 100 
Sources:  MEDIOCREDITO CENTRALE (1962); PERGOLESI (1988) p. 302; BANCA D’ITALIA c 
(1967-1971). 
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Table 2: Subsidised MTC granted as a percentage of subsidised MTC applied for 
 Scheme  S%  
MTC
a 
S %  
MTCi
b 












d   n.a. 
1957-65 MI  n.a.  48
e n.a.  n.a.  n.a. n.a  n.a  n.a. 
1966-70 MI  50    n.a  100  100  99.6  99.7  99.8   99.9 




14   
3



















f    
85.8 
65.5 
1981-86  DPR 902  9  44  89.3  81  83.5  75.3  82.3     86 
1987-93  DPR 902  3.2   17  88.3  90.9  94  51  81    87 
Keys: a= Scheme as % of total MTC; b= Scheme as % of MTC to investment; c= Value of investment 
approved as % of investment projects submitted, national average;
 d= 
 from 1953 to 1955, as only for 
those years was information on applications provided; e=
  as a percentage of subsidised and non-
subsidised medium term credit to industry (1961-64), as these are the only figures published by the 
Bank of Italy in these years appropriate for comparison; f=1978-80 only, as the scheme DPR 902/76 
became operational in 1978; g=
 no requests for loans were reported from the South.  
Sources: MEDIOCREDITO CENTRALE (1955) for data on MTCI scheme; data obtained from the 
MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY for MI and DPR 902 schemes; BANCA D’ITALIA a and b (various 
years) for total subsidised credit and subsidised credit to investment. All data were calculated into 
constant 1980 lire before the percentages were calculated. 
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Table 3: Cassa subsidies to Southern Italy (annual average, bn lire 1980) 
  AS VS AA VA  G  L VA%VS
a  MSD
a 
1957-65 1000  1135  448  289  42  98  25.47  14.46 
1966-70  1073 2116 1043 1550  252  373  73.23 34.79 
1971-75  2712 8067 1219 3167  548  584  39.26 16.51 
1976-80  2017    2,456  1557  1673  436  449  68.13  51.45 
1981-86  2763  2181  1745  961  334 276 44.06  40.00 
1987-93  4315 4508 1865 1426  506  373  31.62 27.85 
Keys: AS=Applications for subsidies submitted to the Cassa; VS=Value of the investments represented 
by applications submitted; AA=Applications accepted by the Cassa; VA=Value of investments 
represented by successful applications; G=Grants given by the Cassa; L=Loans extended by the 
Institutions. MSD=Maximum satisfied demand, calculated as (G+L)/0.85VR until 1975 and as 
(G+L)/0.7VR after 1976; a= overall period. 
Source: Calculations on data provided by the MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY. 
 
Table 4: Soft loan scheme 902/76 
Area
 a Firm  size
b Max.  invest. Coverage
c  Period  Interest (% R. R)
d
South   15  bn*  40%  15  30 
Centre (underd)  < 5 bn  7 bn  60%  10  40 
North (underd)  <4 bn  3 bn  60%  10  40 
Elsewhere  <2 bn  4 bn  50%  10  60 
Keys: a= Italy was subdivided into four areas= 1) South; 2) underdeveloped areas in the Centre; 3) 
underdeveloped areas in the North; 4) the rest of the Centre and North; b= firm size expressed in fixed 
assets; c= coverage as a percentage of investment; d= Interest rate as a percentage of the reference rate; 
* abolished in 1977.        
Sources: PERGOLESI (1988), p. 63 (columns 1 to 4); RONZANI (1980), pp. 142-144 (columns 5 and 
6).   38
 
Table 5 Scheme 657/77 
 Size  invest  Coverage 
a   Period  Interest 
b 
















Keys: a= coverage as a percentage of investment; b=interest rate as a percentage of the Reference Rate.  
Sources:  PERGOLESI (1988), p. 65 (columns 1 to 3); BANCA D’ITALIA c, (1978), p. 163 (columns 
4 and 5).  
 
Table 6:  Cassa grant schemes after 1976 
Investment (bn current lire) Coverage  (%  investment) 
0.2-2   40 






b  20 (on the quota exceeding 7 bn) 
Keys: a=until 1978; b=from 1979 




   39
Figure 1: The regions of Italy 
 
 
Keys: the National Bureau of Statistics (henceforth Istat, Istituto Nazionale di 
Statistica) divides Italy into: North-West= Piedmont, Valle d’Aosta, Lombardy and 
Liguria;  North-East= Trentino-Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Emilia 
Romagna; Centre= Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, Lazio; South= Abruzzo, Molise, 
Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria; Islands= Sicilia and Sardegna. 
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Figure 2: Regional distribution of subsidised MTC, 1966-1993, net balance of credit 
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Figure 3: Regional distribution of subsidised MTC, 1974-1993 (new credit extended, 






















North-West North-East Centre South
Note: the BoI statistics on new credit extended in 1990 are incomplete. These provide 
information only for the last quarter.  
Sources: BANCA D’ITALIA (1971-1983a); BANCA D’ITALIA (1984-1993b). 
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Source: CASSA PER IL MEZZOGIORNO (1951-1993). 
 










1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Years
Sabbatini (1329/65) MI (623/59) Cassa schemes (634/57 and subsequent)
Export credit (131/67 and subsequent) National Fund (183/76) Other schemes
 
Sources: BANCA D’ITALIA (1971-1983a); BANCA D’ITALIA (1984-1993b). 










Sabbatini (1329/65) Export credit (131/67 and
subsequent)
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Sources: BANCA D’ITALIA (1971-1983a); BANCA D’ITALIA (1984-1993b).  
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Figure 7: Geographical distribution of net subsidy within soft loans, 1966-1972 (estimate 























North-West North-East Centre South
 
Source: estimations on BANCA D’ITALIA (1966-1971c).   44
Figure 8: Geographical distribution of net subsidy within soft loans extended, 1974-
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North-West North-East Centre South Total
 
 
Key: Tot South= estimated total subsidy to the South, calculated as annual net subsidy plus annual total 
value of grants approved by the Cassa. 
Source: Estimates based on data from BANCA D’ITALIA (1971-1983a); BANCA D’ITALIA (1984-
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Figure 10: Estimated total subsidies in the South as compared to the rest of the 





















South Total Rest of the country
 
Source: as for figure 9.   47
Figure 11: Average subsidised interest rates and yields on long-term government 








YLTGB Av SIR S Av SIR C/N
Keys: YLTGB= yields on long-term government bonds; Av SIRS= estimated average subsidised 
interest rate in Southern Italy; Av SIRC/N= estimated average subsidised interest rate in the Centre and 
North. 
Sources: CASSA PER IL MEZZOGIORNO (1951-1986); BANCA D’ITALIA (1966-1994c); 
MEDIOCREDITO CENTRALE (1962-1970); GAROFALO and COLONNA (1998), pp. 702-703; 
OECD (1970-1979a); OECD (1981b); IMF (1995). 
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Figure 12: Regional distribution of ordinary MTC, 1966-1991, net balance of credit 
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Sources: BANCA D’ITALIA (1966-1971c); BANCA D’ITALIA (1971-1983a); 
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Figure 13: Regional distribution of ordinary MTC, 1974-1993 (new credit extended, 
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Source: BANCA D’ITALIA (1971-1983a); BANCA D’ITALIA (1984-1994b). 





























Source: CERS-IRS (1989), p. 240.    50
 
 
 
 
 
 